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ABSTRACT 
The  impressive  growth  of  world  aquaculture  has  led  to  profound  transformations  in  the  economic 
structure of several capture fisheries.  Evidence from the Alaska salmon fisheries supports this argument 
as a connection has been suggested between the recent trends of declining ex-vessel prices and the rapid 
development of salmon farming elsewhere in the world.  In Bristol Bay, home of the largest sockeye 
salmon runs in the globe, participation in the limited-entry fishery has declined by approximately 20% 
since  2001.    Likewise,  permit  market  values  have  plummeted  to  historic  low  levels,  with  economic 
conditions not likely to improve significantly in the mid-term future.  To examine this problem, we 
develop  a  formal  analytical  framework  for  the  study  of  market  interactions  between  a  limited-entry 
fishery and an aquaculture sector.  We adapt the model of regulated open-access developed by Homans 
and Wilen to examine the implications of aquaculture development on the actions of fishermen and the 
regulatory  sector  in  a  restricted-access  setting.    Results  indicate  that  the  emergence  of  a  low-cost 
aquaculture sector brings about important structural changes in the restricted-access fishery, rendering 
limited-entry regulations irrelevant as participation rates decline due to the falling prices.  An important 
implication is that, despite the limited-entry constraint, the fishery moves to an institutional arrangement 
closer to regulated open access, with resource rents drastically reduced.  Model predictions are compared 
with  the  empirical  evidence  available  from  the  Bristol  Bay  sockeye  fishery.    The  advantages  of 
cooperative management relative to the current competitive structure of the fishery are highlighted. 
Keywords: Alaska, aquaculture, sockeye salmon, market interactions, co-management. 
INTRODUCTION 
Commercial  aquaculture  production  of  a  number  of  aquatic  species  such  as  salmon  and  shrimp  has 
increased significantly over the last three decades.  In the case of salmon and sea trout, world aquaculture 
production rose from 4.0 thousand metric tons (MT) to 1.48 million MT between 1976 and 2006 [1].  As 
a result, aquaculture already accounts for around 63% of the global supply of salmon.   In terms of 
international trade, the importance of aquaculture is even greater [2]. 
The  growth  of  aquaculture  worldwide  has  generated  important  implications  for  the  management  of 
traditional, common-property fisheries.  Increases in aquaculture production have been accompanied by 
reductions in the prices of aquaculture and closely related species supplied by the capture fisheries.  A 
dramatic example of this type of interactions is offered by the various salmon fisheries in Alaska.  One of 
these fisheries, based on the river systems of Bristol Bay, is considered to have the largest sockeye 
salmon runs in the world.  Despite judicious management of the sockeye salmon stocks by the Alaska 
Department of Fish and Game (ADF&G), the ex-vessel value of the fishery has declined to historic low 
levels in recent years.  The decrease in value is directly related to falling prices as total annual harvest 
from the fishery has fluctuated around 65,000 MT (143 million pounds) during the last two and a half 
decades.  The nominal ex-vessel price of sockeye salmon in Bristol Bay fell from $2.11/lb in 1988 to a 
historic low of $0.42/lb in 2001 (Fig. 1).  During the same time period, Japanese imports of farmed IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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Atlantic salmon increased from one thousand to 37.5 thousand MT (Japan is the primary market outlet for 
frozen Bristol Bay sockeye salmon).  This scenario of successful biological management coupled with 
reduced value and economic distress for the fishermen has motivated discussions on the rationale of 
management plans focused solely on the maximization of sustainable yield from the fishery.  Industry 
observers  have  pointed  out  that  management  should  be  re-oriented towards improving  the  economic 
performance of the fishery, given the increasing competition from aquaculture producers [3, 4]. 
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Figure 1.  Annual landings and nominal ex-vessel price of sockeye salmon in Bristol Bay, Alaska.  
Source:  [5]. 
The Bristol Bay fishery for sockeye salmon Oncorhyinchus nerka takes place in a geographically remote 
location in the southeastern portion of the Bering Sea in southwestern Alaska.  The fishery is managed 
under a limited entry program established for Alaska salmon fisheries in 1973.  The fishery consists of 
1,862 drift-net permits (gillnet boats) and 988 set-net permits (shore-based set netters).  On average, the 
drift-net fleet captures 85% of the catch while the set net fishery gets the remaining 15% [5].  Statistics 
from the Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission (CFEC) indicate that the vast majority of these 
permits were fished during the 1980s and 1990s [6].  However, due to the adverse economic conditions, a 
substantial number  of  drift  and  setnet  permit  holders  have  opted  out from  the  fishery  since  2001, a 
remarkable event in the history of the limited-entry program (Fig. 2).  Between 2000 and 2002, the 
number of driftnet permits fished declined by 35% (from 1,823 to 1,184) while the number of setnet 
permits fished declined by 26% (from 921 to 680).  The processing sector was also affected as a number 
of well-established firms pulled out of Bristol Bay.  Participation in the drift and setnet fisheries has 
improved since 2003 as ex-vessel prices have recovered to some degree.  However, a substantial number 
of fishing permits still remain unused every year. 
The bleak economic outlook for the industry is reflected in a number of indicators.  For example, nominal 
permit prices in 2002 for the drift gillnet fishery were only 8% of the respective price in 1989 (Fig. 2).  
By 2006, permit prices had recovered to some extent but still remained well below the levels observed in 
the early 1990s.  In properly functioning markets, license prices act as indicators of future expected rents 
[7]. Because the global salmon aquaculture industry is expected to experience further growth, permit 
prices in the Bristol Bay sockeye salmon fishery are not likely to increase substantially in the near and 
mid-term future. 
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Figure 2.  Percent of permits fished and permit market value (nominal US Dollars) in the driftnet Bristol 
Bay sockeye salmon fishery (1980-2007).  Sources:  [5, 6]. 
The Bristol Bay sockeye salmon fishery provides an appropriate empirical setting for the analysis of 
market interactions between aquaculture and common-property fisheries.  Unlike other important salmon 
fishing locations such as British Columbia and the U.S. Pacific Northwest, wild salmon stocks are not 
physically exposed to netpen farming facilities in Bristol Bay (ocean growout of finfish is prohibited in 
Alaska).  Similarly, salmon enhancement programs are nonexistent in Bristol Bay.  The only interaction 
between salmon aquaculture and the Bristol Bay fishery occurs through the market price for salmon. 
The formal economic analysis of market interactions between aquaculture and commercial fisheries began 
with  Anderson  [8].    In  an  open-access  setting,  he  demonstrated  that  the  entry  of  competitive 
aquaculturists increases natural fish stocks, reduces price, and increases supply from the commercial 
fishery.  Despite the important implications derived from Anderson’s analysis, the conservation-related 
benefits for natural fish stocks attributable to aquaculture have been difficult to measure empirically for a 
number of reasons [9].  Confounding factors such as enhancement programs and fishing effort regulations 
have obscured the stock-rebuilding effects of price reductions caused by aquaculture. 
The two major goals of this paper are 1) to extend the theoretical work of Anderson [8] by including the 
case of limited-entry fisheries; and 2) to contrast the implications of the theoretical model against the 
empirical evidence available from the Bristol Bay sockeye fishery.  Even though it is an illustrative case, 
the open-access context examined by Anderson [8] is not representative of most modern fisheries, which 
are now managed under some sort of limited entry regulation.  A more comprehensive analysis needs to 
make explicit consideration of the regulatory sector.  To this end, the model of regulated open-access 
(ROA) fisheries developed by Homans and Wilen [10] is adapted to the case of a limited-entry fishery 
with a regulatory sector enforcing season length restrictions to keep the biomass of the fish stock above a 
sustainable threshold level.  This model is then used to examine the effects of price reductions caused by 
aquaculture on the bioeconomic equilibrium established between the fishing and regulatory sectors. 
The following section of this paper describes the Homans and Wilen’s model [10] of regulated open-
access  fisheries  and  its  application  to  a  restricted-access  setting.    Next,  an  econometric  model  is 
formulated to test the theoretical framework using data from the Bristol Bay fishery.  In the final section, 
results from the econometric model are used to examine the advantages of harvesting cooperatives vis-à-
vis the current structure of competitive fishing, given the current scenario of low prices and competition 
from aquaculture. IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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THE MODEL 
Homans  and  Wilen’s  model  [10]  of  regulated  open  access  resource  exploitation  is  based  on  the 
assumption that fishery regulators choose target harvest levels according to a safe stock concept.  In 
salmon fisheries, this concept is analogous to the notion of escapement goals, which forms the centerpiece 
of sustainable management philosophy in Alaska. In the model, harvest quotas are implemented by setting 
season lengths, conditioned on the level of capacity committed by the industry.  In turn, the industry 
enters the fishery until rents are dissipated, conditioned on season length regulations.  A joint economic 
equilibrium determines the final fishing capacity, season length, and harvest level outcomes. 
By using an instantaneous Schaefer-type harvest function, Homans and Wilen assume that fish biomass 
declines by the fishing rate within a single season according to the equation 
 
( ) ( ), X t qEX t = − ɺ    (Eq. 1) 
 
where X is the biomass level in period t of a given season, q is the catchability parameter, and E is a 
measure of fishing capacity.  Under these assumptions, total cumulative harvest H for the industry over a 
season of length T is given by 
 
( ) 0 0 ( ) ( ) 1 ,
qET H T X X T X e
− = − = −   (Eq. 2) 
 
or, adapted to the case of salmon fisheries, Total Harvest = Total Run minus Escapement. 
 
Assuming linear variable and fixed costs, total industry rents for a season of length T can be written as 
 
Rents  ( ) [ ] 0 1 ,
qET PX e vET fE
−   = − − +     (Eq. 3) 
 
where P is ex-vessel price,  0 X  is the biomass size at time t = 0 (or initial run size), and v and f are the 
variable and fixed cost coefficients, respectively. 
 
Regulators are concerned with setting the season length T in such a way that a specific escapement goal 
(S*) is met; i.e., season length T must be short enough to ensure that a minimum salmon population 
escapes to the upstream spawning locations.  It can be demonstrated that regulators choose T according to 
the equation 
 
0
*
1
ln
X
T
qE S
  =    
  (Eq. 4) 
 
Equations 3 and 4 determine a joint regulated open-access equilibrium, which occurs at an effort level and 
season length as depicted at the intersection A of the industry and regulatory agency curves shown in Fig. 
3.  The industry curve slopes upward over the relevant section of Fig. 3 because higher levels of effort can 
be supported by the fishery when the fishing season T is lengthened (i.e., a greater biomass is available 
for harvesting).  Conversely, the agency curve slopes downward because tradeoffs between season length 
T and effort level E must be made in order to meet the escapement goal S*. 
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Figure 3.  Joint regulated equilibrium in the model of the regulated open-access fishery.  Source: [10]. 
 
 
The Limited-Entry Fishery 
 
By assuming that effort E represents the number of vessels in a homogeneous fishery, the regulated open-
access model can be adapted to include the case of a limited-entry fishery, with an upper cap on the 
number of vessels granted a fishing permit.  Figure 4 illustrates Homans and Wilen’s model with the level 
of effort restricted to be less than or equal to ELE.  Assuming that other regulations are in place to reduce 
the potential for significant capital stuffing, it is clear that the limited-entry requirement has the potential 
to re-capture some of the rents dissipated under regulated open-access.  Equilibrium eLE in Fig. 4 implies a 
lower level of effort and a longer fishing season T as compared to eROA.  The vertical distance between the 
two industry curves provide a measure of the level of rents generated by the limited-entry regulation. 
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Figure 4.  The case of the limited-entry fishery.  ROA = Regulated open access.  LE  = Limited entry. 
 
 
An important implication from the Homans and Wilen’s model is that the industry curve (ROA) will shift 
downwards with reductions in price.  If the price reduction is significant, the ROA curve may drift below 
the limited-entry constraint (ELE).  In such a case, participation in the fishery will fall below 100% (not all 
fishing permits will be used) and rents will again be dissipated.  In other words, the fishery will return to a 
regulated open-access equilibrium (eB in Fig. 5) if the limited-entry cap remains fixed at the same level. 
The limited-entry fishery model presented in Fig. 5 provides a theoretical basis to the phenomenon of 
unused fishing permits observed in Bristol Bay since 2001 (Fig. 2).  The emergence of aquaculture has 
depressed ex-vessel prices to the point that the underlying ROA industry curve has shifted below the 
limited-entry  restriction.    In  other  words,  current  limited-entry  regulations  are  failing  to  create  any IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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significant wealth from the fishery as declining prices have substantially reduced the level of effort that 
can be supported by the resource.  The presence of the regulatory sector ensures that escapement goals are 
still  met,  meaning  that  harvest  levels  remain  constant  (assuming  all  other  parameters  remain  also 
constant) even when rents have been completely dissipated. 
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Figure 5.  Effect of a reduction in price from PA to PB in the limited-entry fishery model.  All other model 
parameters are held constant.  ROA = Regulated open access.  LE  = Limited entry. 
 
 
AN ECONOMETRIC MODEL FOR THE BRISTOL BAY DRIFT GILLNET FISHERY 
 
An econometric model was developed to determine whether the empirical evidence available from the 
Bristol Bay drift gillnet fishery conforms to the theoretical model presented in Fig. 5.  The Bristol Bay 
fishery consists of five major river systems (Naknek-Kvichak, Egegik, Ugashik, Nushagak, and Togiak).  
Each  one  of  them  is  managed  as  an  independent  unit  by  the  Alaska  Department  of  Fish  &  Game 
(ADF&G), meaning that different escapement goals are defined for each river system according to the 
unique biological characteristics of its salmon runs.  The ADF&G collects information on size of runs, 
escapement and harvest levels, length of fishing season, and levels of active effort for each river system 
[5].  Annual average ex-vessel prices for Bristol Bay are also reported by the ADF&G. 
 
Equations  3  and  4  form  the  theoretical  foundation  for  the  econometric  models.    The  models  were 
estimated separately for each river system, using data from the period 1980-2006.  Although the total 
number of permitted vessels remained relatively constant for all of Bristol Bay over the study period, the 
level of effort in each river system varies every year because vessels are relatively mobile among rivers.  
Therefore, rivers with stronger runs will tend to attract a greater number of boats.  The strength of runs 
changes by river system and by year.  An important implication of the mobility of effort is that rents tend 
to be equalized across river systems over the fishing season.   
 
Because the limited-entry constraint was binding from 1980 through 2000 (Fig. 2), a Simultaneous Tobit 
formulation is required to account for the censored nature of the endogenous regressor E in Eq. 3 and 4.  
Because rents tend to be equalized across river systems, it is assumed that observations for effort E are 
censored in all rivers for the period 1980-2000.  Observations from 2001 through 2006 are assumed to be 
not censored. 
 
For the years when the limited-entry constraint is binding (1980-2000), the econometric model is given 
by the system of equations 
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0
1
1
ln
t
t t
t t
X
T
qE S
ε
 
= −  
 
  (Eq. 5) 
 
( ) 2 0 1
qET b
t PX e vE T fE ε
−     < − − +     ,  (Eq. 6) 
 
where b is an exponential parameter accounting for non-linearity of variable costs,  1t ε  and  2t ε are error 
terms, and all other parameters as defined previously.  Equations 5 and 6 correspond to the regulatory 
agency and industry equations, respectively.  The comparison operator < is introduced in Eq. 6 to indicate 
that total rents are greater than zero because the endogenous regressor E has been censored to a level 
lower than that leading to complete rent dissipation.  
 
When  the  limited-entry  constraint  is  not  binding  (2001-2006),  the  resulting  system  of  equations 
corresponds to the regulated open-access model proposed by Homans and Wilen: 
 
0
1
1
ln
t
t t
t t
X
T
qE S
ε
 
= −  
 
  (Eq. 7) 
 
( ) 2 0 1
qET b
t PX e vE T fE ε
−     = − − +     .  (Eq. 8) 
The Simultaneous Tobit model is estimated using a Full Information Maximum Likelihood procedure 
[11].  If  ( ) 1 2 , f ε ε  is the joint density of  1 ε and  2 ε , then the likelihood function is given by  
( )
0(1 )
0
2 2
1
, , , , ln , .
qET b PX e vE T fE
E E
X
L q v b f f T d
qE S
ε ε
− − − −
−∞
=
    ∑ = −         ∏∫  
                         ( )
0
0
1
ln , 1
qET b
E E
X
f T PX e vE T fE
qE S
−
<
      − − − +           ∏ ,  (Eq. 9) 
 
where  E E =   and  E E <   denote  the  set  of  censored  (1980-2000)  and  uncensored  (2001-2006) 
observations, respectively.  Σ Σ Σ Σ is the covariance matrix of the equation error terms: 
 
( )
2
1 1 2
1 2 2
1 2 2
, t t Cov
σ ρσ σ
ε ε
ρσ σ σ
 
∑ = =  
 
. 
 
Estimation of equation 9 is complicated by the presence of the integral term in the RHS.  However, this 
expression can be simplified by writing  ( ) 1 2 , f ε ε  as  1 2 1 ( ). ( | ) f f ε ε ε .  Note that  2 1 | ε ε is normal, with 
mean 
2
1
1
σ
ρ ε
σ
 
 
 
 and variance  ( )
2 2
2 1 σ ρ −  [12].  Therefore, the integral term in equation 9 can be re-
written as 
 
0(1 )
0
2 2
1
ln ,
qET b PX e vE T fE X
f T d
qE S
ε ε
− − − −
−∞
    − =         ∫  IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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( )
0 2 0
0
1
1
2 1 1 2
2
1 1 (1 ) ln ln
1
.
1
qET b X X PX e vE T fE T T
qE S qE S
σ
ρ
σ
φ
σ σ
σ ρ
−           − − − − − −                     Φ
   
−    
     
,  (Eq. 10) 
 
where Φ and φ  denote the univariate standard normal distribution and density functions, respectively. 
 
Codes were written using R 2.6.0 [12] for the estimation of the Simultaneous Tobit model (Eq. 9 and 10). 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Table I presents the results of the Simultaneous Tobit model for each river system.  The estimate of the 
catchability coefficient q was found to be highly significant across river systems.  Likelihood Ratio tests 
were conducted to examine the overall significance of the cost parameters v, b, and f.  Results rejected the 
joint hypothesis that the three coefficients were all equal to zero. 
 
Table I.  Coefficient Estimates from the Simultaneous Tobit Model of the Drift Gillnet Fishery in 
Bristol Bay, Alaska.  Numbers in Parentheses Indicate the Asymptotic t-ratios. 
  Naknek  Egegik  Ugashik  Nushagak  Togiak 
q  2.63
*** 
(10.94) 
7.77
*** 
(17.25) 
9.52
*** 
(10.01) 
5.78
*** 
(11.08) 
17.85
*** 
(7.97) 
v  10.43 
(0.12) 
40.35 
(0.20) 
27.34 
(0.18) 
73.98 
(0.93) 
38.13 
(0.60) 
f  23.61
*** 
(3.45) 
26.24
* 
(1.75) 
9.50 
(1.19) 
26.40
*** 
(3.29) 
7.67 
(1.53) 
b  4.02 
(0.53) 
3.34 
(1.55) 
2.34
** 
(2.18) 
3.10
*** 
(3.68) 
2.02
*** 
(3.19) 
1 σ   0.29
*** 
(7.30) 
0.17
*** 
(7.33) 
0.24
*** 
(7.34) 
0.22
*** 
(7.34) 
0.51
*** 
(7.30) 
2 σ   3.83
*** 
(3.32) 
4.58
*** 
(3.75) 
1.28
*** 
(3.32) 
4.42
*** 
(4.40) 
0.28
*** 
(2.79) 
ρ   0.37 
(1.21) 
-0.28 
(-0.64) 
-0.90
*** 
(-7.18) 
-0.14 
(-0.24) 
-0.10 
(-0.26) 
     * :  Significant at 10% level.     ** :  Significant at 5% level.     *** : Significant at 1% level. 
 
 
The coefficient estimates in Table I can be used to calculate the annual equilibrium levels of effort that 
would emerge if the binding limited-entry constraints were removed (the equilibrium levels correspond to 
eROA in Fig. 4).  Rents are completely dissipated at these effort levels.  Figure 6 illustrates these results for 
the Naknek River during 1980-2000.  Because ex-vessel prices were relatively high during this period 
(Fig. 1), the fishery would attract a relatively high number of vessels (triangles in Fig. 6) if the limited-
entry regulations were not in place.  By the late 1990s, however, the underlying levels of effort under 
ROA decline as ex-vessel prices fall.  From 2001 through 2006, a regulated open-access equilibrium 
emerges in the fishery as participation rates fall below 100%; i.e., the limited-entry constraint is not 
binding anymore.  The predicted levels of effort for 2001-2006 correspond to the intersection eB in Fig. 5, 
approximately matching the actual levels of effort observed in the fishery (Fig. 6). IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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Figure 6.  Historical levels of effort in the drift gillnet sockeye fishery in Naknek River, Bristol Bay, and 
predictions from the Simultaneous Tobit model.  The limited-entry constraint was binding during 1980-
2000.  
 
The  nature  of  market  interactions  between  the  aquaculture industry  and  the  salmon  fishery  is  better 
understood by illustrating how the industry curve in the regulated open access model has shifted over time 
as a result of the steep decline in ex-vessel prices (see Fig. 5).  To this end, Fig. 7 displays the industry 
and agency curves estimated for the Naknek River for the years 1994 and 2006.  These two years were 
selected  because  the  respective  salmon  runs  shared  similar  characteristics  (similar  run  size  and 
escapement levels), meaning that the agency curves (T94 and T06) are relatively close to each other in 
Effort : Season Length space. 
 
The intersection of the E94-ROA and T94 curves in Fig.7 indicates the ROA equilibrium that would have 
emerged if the limited-entry regulations (which capped effort at 644 vessels) had not been in place.  The 
intersection of the E94-LE and T94 curves represents the predicted outcome of the model given the limited-
entry constraint while the triangular dot denotes the actual outcome.  The most striking feature in Fig. 7 is 
the remarkable downward shift of the industry curve by 2006 (E06-ROA) resulting from the drastic decline 
in ex-vessel prices (from $1.00 to $0.42/lb in 1995 US Dollars).  The intersection of the E06-ROA and T06 
curves indicates the predicted regulated open-access equilibrium emerging in 2006, while the rounded dot 
denotes the actual outcome.  The predicted and actual levels of effort observed in 2006 are lower than the 
limited-entry restriction observed in 1994, suggesting less than 100% participation. 
 
THE ECONOMIC CASE FOR HARVESTING COOPERATIVES 
 
Figure 7 clearly illustrates the profound changes in the economic structure of the Bristol Bay fishery 
taking place over the last 10-15 years.  When ex-vessel prices were high, the fishery generated substantial 
rents given the restrictions on access to the resource.  This potential for rents was reflected in the high 
value of permits observed in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Fig. 2).  The advent of aquaculture has 
changed this economic scenario, forcing the fishery to move to an institutional arrangement closer to 
regulated open access conditions.  The fishery will continue to generate low rents if no decisions are made 
to tighten up limited-entry restrictions even further in order to reduce some of the redundant effort. 
 
A major problem with strategies simply focused on restricting access to the resource (such as the limited-
entry program) is their failure to address the underlying structure of incentives that leads to competitive 
fishing and the excessive use of inputs in the first place.  Under the current structure of competitive 
fishing, fishermen have strong incentives to circumvent existing regulations in order to gain additional 
access to the resource.  This process may eventually lead to further dissipation of rents. IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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Figure 7.  Predictions from the econometric model of the drift gillnet sockeye fishery in Naknek River, 
Bristol Bay, 1994 vs. 2006.  The limited-entry constraint was binding in 1994.   
ROA = Regulated Open Access.  LE = Limited Entry. 
 
Harvesting cooperatives may provide a solution to the problems generated by competitive fishing by 
better defining property rights and modifying the structure of incentives for access to the resource.  The 
notion behind harvesting cooperatives is that a portion of the harvest is allocated a priori to a group of 
cooperative  fishermen,  who  combine  their  inputs  to  harvest  the  resource  in  the  most  cost-efficient 
manner. 
 
The regulated open-access model from Homans and Wilen [11] can be adapted to derive industry curves 
for  harvesting  cooperatives.    For  illustration  purposes,  Figure  8  compares  the  equilibrium  outcomes 
resulting  from  a  regulated  open  access  fishery  (eROA),  a  limited-entry  fishery  (eLE),  and  a  harvesting 
cooperative (eHC-1).  The latter curve is derived by assuming that the harvesting cooperative selects the 
level of effort that maximizes rents (see Eq. 3), regarding T as given by the regulating agency.  The 
agency takes into account the profit-maximizing behavior of the harvesting cooperative to determine the 
equilibrium level of T.  Because the harvesting cooperative is concerned with maximization of rents, the 
equilibrium eHC-1 is characterized by a lower effort level as compared to eROA.  The equilibrium eLE may 
imply a higher o lower level of effort than eHC-1. 
 
The  outcome  eHC-1  in  Fig.  8  can  be  interpreted  as  a  non-cooperative  Nash  equilibrium  between  the 
regulatory agency and the fishing industry.  However, higher rents are possible at the equilibrium eHC-2, 
which emerges as a coordinated outcome between the harvesting cooperative and the regulatory agency.  
To understand why maximum rents are achieved at eHC-2, it is useful to view the agency curve T as an 
isoquant (with a constant number of fish as output) that requires the combination of two inputs: effort E 
and time T.  Because E is a costly input while T is free (ignoring aspects such as the time value of 
money), costs are minimized by substituting time for effort.  In other words, harvesting cooperatives 
maximize rents by extending fishing seasons to the largest possible extent (TMax in Fig. 8) and employing 
the lowest possible levels of effort. 
 
Parameter estimates of the Simultaneous Tobit Model (Table I) can be used to determine the optimal level 
of effort (number of vessels) that a harvesting cooperative would employ in Bristol Bay (all river systems) 
while exactly meeting the required escapement goals.  Results are presented in Figure 9.  This estimation 
assumes a cooperative agreement between the regulatory agency and the fishermen (eHC-2 in Fig. 8) with a 
minimum season length of 1,000 hours.  At relatively high ex-vessel prices (late 1980s and early 1990s), IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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the harvesting cooperative employs around 1,000 vessels, which corresponds approximately to 55% of the 
fishing effort allowed under limited-entry.  During years of low prices and poor salmon runs (2001-2002), 
the optimal number of vessels declines to around 500.  The optimal number of vessels would be even 
lower if fishermen were allowed to let a greater portion of the run escape upstream (i.e., let escapement 
goals be higher than required by regulators) during years of weak runs. 
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Figure 8.  Comparison of joint equilibria in the model of the regulated fishery under different institutional 
arrangements.  ROA = Regulated Open Access.  LE = Limited Entry.  HC-1 = Harvesting Cooperative 
outcome assuming no cooperation with regulatory agency.  HC-2 = Harvesting Cooperative outcome 
assuming cooperation with regulatory agency.   
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Figure 9.  Optimal number of vessels employed by a harvesting cooperative in the drift gillnet fishery for 
sockeye salmon in Bristol Bay.  The model assumes a minimum season length of 1,000 hours and a 
cooperative agreement with the regulatory agency (equilibrium eHC-2 in Fig. 8).    
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Anderson’s analysis [9] demonstrated the positive changes that aquaculture development could bring 
upon open-access fisheries exploited beyond maximum sustainable yield (MSY).  These benefits include 
increased harvest and stock levels and lower prices for the consumer.  In the case of regulated open-
access and limited-entry fisheries, the effects of aquaculture on harvest and stock levels are minimal due IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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to the presence of a regulatory sector that prevents stock biomass from falling below the MSY level.  
However, aquaculture has a strong effect on the economic structure of limited-entry fisheries.  Because 
lower prices lead to reduced gross revenue in the fishery, the economic rents created in a limited-entry 
program will fall considerably if limited-entry regulations are not revised to reflect the new economic 
conditions.  If prices are sufficiently low, the fishery will return to a regulated open-access equilibrium 
despite entry restrictions.  This is the current situation of the Bristol Bay sockeye salmon fishery. 
 
Our analysis demonstrates that harvesting cooperatives provides an institutional arrangement with the 
potential to extract rents from the regulated fishery despite competition from aquaculture.  Cooperatives 
perform better because the set of incentives is transformed from a competitive fishing structure (leading 
to rent dissipation) to a rights-based scenario allowing maximization of rents.  Recent evidence from a 
salmon cooperative that operated in Chignik (also located in Alaska) during 2002-2005 seems to confirm 
the predictions of our model [13]. 
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